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The purpose of this paper is to tel the story of a “miracle” that took place in 
Japan folowing World War II (WWII), causing it to literaly rise from the ashes 
of the war to become a leading world economy. The paper is organized as 
folow:
　1. Introduction
　2. MacArthur sets up shop (SCAP)
　3. Homer M. Sarasohn arives
　4. Charles W. Protzman arives
　5. The CCS Seminars
　6. The Aftermath
　7. Summary and conclusions
1. Introduction
Dr. W. Edwards Deming had a great influence on the Japanese after WWII in 
the area of quality. In fact, The Deming Prize was established in December 
1950 to recognize Japanese companies for improvements in quality. However, 
even before Deming’s rise to fame in Japan, two American engineers, Homer 
M. Sarasohn and Charles W. Protzman,1) played a pivotal role in helping 
Japanese industry recover by teaching Japanese industrialists the tenets of good 
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 1)　Although not as directly involved as Sarasohn and Protzman, a third person was 
also important in promoting the work of these two engineers, Frank Polkinghorn. As 
wil be seen, Polkinghorn helped break a bureaucratic logjam to let them carry out the 
“miracle.” Hopper & Hopper (2007) cal them “the three wise men.”
management emphasizing quality control.
It is ironic that Japan, with al its considerable military might, could not 
dominate East Asia as it tried to do before and during WWII, yet after the war 
and in a relatively short time was to become an economy second only to the 
country that defeated it. This is the story of how Japan got started, with 
Sarasohn and Protzman’s help, on that road to economic “domination,” 
seemingly against al odds.
It is also a story of how what the Japanese learned about good management 
from Sarasohn and Protzman came to not only benefit the Japanese but also 
much of the rest of the world.
2. MacArthur Sets Up Shop (SCAP)
With the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and 
then, three days later, on Nagasaki, Japan finaly gave up and formaly 
surrendered on September 2.2) In anticipation of Japan’s surrender, the 
forerunner of SCAP,3) Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), was established in 
April 1945 with General MacArthur designated as its Commander in Chief 
(CINCAFPAC). According to Reports of General MacArthur,4) p. 67, 
MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander for the Alied Powers (SCAP) 
on August 14, 1945. On October 2, 1945 the SCAP GHQ was established using 
the general staff sections of AFPAC to also serve the military staff needs of 
SCAP. On that same day ten special staff sections were activated to cover 
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 2)　The initial surrender occurred on August 14, 1945 with the acceptance by Japan of 
the Potsdam Declaration. On the folowing day Emperor Hirohito announced the 
surender on the radio (Wikipedia, htp:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surender_of_Japan).
 3)　Supreme Commander for the Alied Powers but used to also mean the organization 
itself; i.e., the General Headquarters (GHQ).
 4)　Specificaly this part: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, 
Volume I Supplement (1950). Hereinafter “Reports.”
various areas that needed atention vis-à-vis the effective running of the 
occupation such as education, health, government, etc. (Reports, pp. 75 & 76). 
Among these special sections was the Civil Communications Section, also 
known as CCS. As wil be seen, CCS came to play a key role in Japan’s 
recovery. Figure 1 (see pages 129/130) shows the GHQ organization as it was 
on December 31, 1947. SCAP continued to exist until the peace treaty with 
Japan came into force in 1952.
The task facing SCAP was enormous. As described by the website japan-
guide.com:
After World War II had ended, Japan was devastated. Al the large 
cities (with the exception of Kyoto), the industries and the transportation 
networks were severely damaged. A severe shortage of food continued for 
several years.5)
Where to begin? It is worth noting here the significantly diferent approach 
MacArthur took from what might have been expected. Rather than go in with a 
heavy hand and completely take over the existing Japanese government, 
MacArthur decided to use it as a partner in furthering the goals of the 
occupation. For this he was seen as being too “soft” by critics prompting him to 
make a press release on September 14, 1945 that assured these critics he had the 
situation wel in hand:
Economicaly and industrialy, as wel as militarily, Japan is completely 
exhausted and depleted. She is in a condition of uter colapse, her 
governmental structure is controled completely by the occupation forces 
and is operating only to the extent necessary to insure such an orderly and 
controled procedure as wil prevent social chaos, disease and starvation 
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 5)　As this is writen one can get some idea of what it must have been like from the 
terrible devastation recently sufer from the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami in 
northeastern Japan.
(Reports, p. 56).
Using the Japanese government, MacArthur quickly moved to reform Japan 
from its previous authoritarian militaristic structure:
Beginning with the famous “Bil of Rights” directive in the second month 
of the Occupation, SCAP had issued a steady stream of orders to the 
Japanese Government designed to destroy those influences in Japan which 
had led her into war, and to establish a democratic form of government. 
Political prisoners were liberated; the secret police force was dissolved; 
Shinto religion was separated from the state; the Emperor renounced his 
divinity; women’s sufrage was promulgated; the educational system was 
revised; trade unions were legalized; and scores of other political and social 
reforms were launched (Reports, p. 57).
These moves along with the immediate aid brought in to aleviate hunger and 
steps taken to ensure an orderly occupation essentialy free of any criminal 
activity on the part of the occupation forces soon caused the majority of the 
Japanese people to revise their opinion of Americans. Again from Reports, p. 51:
They [the Japanese] had accepted the Americans cautiously and were 
eventualy impressed by the complete absence of systematic looting and 
violence which many had fuly expected. The one factor which had an 
immediately noticeable efect on the people of Japan was the spontaneous 
generosity of the Americans.
It is indeed a tribute to MacArthur that he had the wisdom and foresight to 
treat the Japanese people this way and, in efect, emphasize the “giving them a 
fishing pole” vs. only “fish” so they could just that much faster begin becoming 
a productive and positive force in the global economy versus a drag on it. Of 
course that this proved true is now history.
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Figure 1. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Alied Power (SCAP). December 31, 1947
3. Homer M. Sarasohn Arrives
Barely eight months after Japan’s surrender, Homer Sarasohn, a 29-year-old 
American radar/radio engineer, arrives on the scene in April 1946. Summoned 
to Japan by SCAP, in a note in Fisher (2008), “Sarasohn identified his pre-Japan 
experience in managing a rapid transition from prototype micro transmiters to 
production models as being a key reason why Douglas MacArthur brought him 
to Japan to establish the radio communications industry” (p. 22).6)
One of SCAP’s biggest concerns in those early post-war days was having a 
way to quickly let the people of Japan know what was going on since it would 
be implementing what amounted to a major cultural shift from a country 
previously dominated by essentialy a military dictatorship. The existing public 
communications was almost nonexistent and both the telephone and radio 
systems had to be restored. In particular the best way to “get the word out” 
would be to build a viable radio system. This then was Sarasohn’s goal. But the 
problems were staggering. In his own words:
Factory sites had to be cleared of rubble so that shacks could be put up to 
house production machinery and workers. Machinery had to be instaled, 
repaired and refurbished. Workers had to be recruited and trained. Supplies 
and raw materials had to be located and brought in. Supervisors and 
managers had to be chosen, some almost at random, and put in place. Most 
of them were strangers to their jobs.. .. more accustomed to folowing 
orders, rather than giving direction.. They had to be instructed on a day-to-
day basis how to set up, run, and manage a mass production system. And, 
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 6)　It seems worth noting that Sarasohn’s initial contact with the U.S. Army was when 
working at the famous Rad Lab (Radiation Laboratory) at MIT that developed most 
of the microwave radars used in WWII and the first worldwide navigation system, 
LORAN.
that is what we in CCS did (Sarasohn, 1997, p. 104).
CCS, the Civil Communications Section mentioned above, was one of the 
many staf sections under SCAP (see Figure 1). Sarasohn was mainly assigned 
to do three things: supply radios to the Japanese, set up a reliable nation-wide 
telecommunications facility, and help revive the Japanese communications 
industry; Sarasohn would be concentrating mostly on the task of geting radios 
into the hands of the Japanese people with others in CCS working on the second 
task. Sarasohn felt if they “were successful in accomplishing the first two, the 
other would take care of itself” (p. 103).
Soon realizing the need to improve the dismal quality of radio receiver 
production Sarasohn caled a meeting of plant managers. The purpose of the 
meeting was to get them to begin thinking on their own about the problem and 
how it might be solved: i.e., “I wanted to get them involved in participative 
management.” Sarasohn asked them to tel him, in their opinion, the reason for 
the poor quality problem and what could be done about it.
At first there was dead silence. They seemed shocked and surprised. No 
one had ever asked for their opinion on anything before. I put my question 
to them again. Then, they al got up and moved down to the far end of the 
table. They began a discussion among themselves (p. 105).
It turned out they were trying to come up with an answer that would please 
Sarasohn, not realy provide an honest response. This led Sarasohn to begin a 
series of meeting with these managers requiring them to begin indentifying 
operating problems within their own companies and coming up with solutions. 
And, in Sarasohn’s words:
The list was imposing: workplace cleanliness, scheduled machine 
maintenance, on-time work flow, effective job training, realistic quality 
standards, and much more. Each of these items caled for careful analysis, 
timely decisions, corrective action and, above al, management folow-
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through (p. 105).
The idea was to get the managers to understand and practice what Sarasohn 
caled progressive management:
• Commitment to the defined goals and spirit of the enterprise.
• A personal sense of Ownership of and in the organization.
• Feedback, up, down and across the lines of the organization.. (p. 106)
Although stil not without problems, Sarasohn states that “by 1948, the 
communications industry.. ..seemed wel on the road to recovery” (p. 106). 
However to show al was not roses yet, Sarasohn recounts a visit he had to a 
company he had assigned to design and build something7) for NHK, Japan’s 
principle radio broadcaster: “the work place was dirty, parts were strewn about, 
the design [of the equipment] was only partly done and, at that, it seemed 
crude.” On top of that “neither the president nor the chief engineer was present” 
(p. 106). Sarasohn walked out in disgust and was about to take the job away 
from them when the president and chief engineer soon showed up at his ofice 
asking what they could do to change things. Obviously they made a turnaround, 
as this operation was the beginning of the Sony Corporation.
4. Charles W. Protzman Arrives
Two and one half years after Sarasohn arrived in Japan, another engineer 
arrived in November 1948 to work in the CCS of SCAP, Charles Protzman. 
Protzman was on loan from Western Electric, the manufacturing arm of AT&T. 
In his own words (Protzman, 1950), he was expected to “act in the capacity of a 
technical advisor to SCAP and the Japanese communications manufacturers on 
engineering and production problems relating to the apparatus, equipment, wire, 
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 7)　A sophisticated audio-mixing console that, with Sarasohn’s threat of taking the 
order away, caused an excelent console to be completed on time (Hopper & Hopper, 
2007, p. 118).
and cable” (p. 1).8)
Since communications equipment production seemed to be “on the road to 
recovery” by this time, and thus not requiring so much direct involvement by 
the CCS, Sarasohn tels of “two new concepts” the CCS adopted about this 
time: quality certification and management qualification. To handle quality 
certification Sarasohn setup a national electrical testing laboratory in cooperation 
with the Japanese managers and engineers. The idea was “to make each 
manager individualy responsible for the quality of his product and his function” 
(Sarasohn, 1997, p. 107).
The problem of “management qualification” would be tackled definitively 
towards the end of 1949 through a joint effort on the part of Sarasohn and 
Protzman. That there was a stil a problem is wel ilustrated by both Sarasohn 
and Protzman. Sarasohn, speaking of the “junior level managers [who] had been 
squeezed into senior level positions”:
By and large, they had responded admirably to the chalenge. They were 
becoming increasingly efective. Nevertheless, it was obvious there was no 
depth to the available resource. Moreover, the cultural influence of the 
feudal environment from which they had emerged was stil quite evident. It 
was clear to us that an intensive management training course was needed 
(Sarasohn, p. 107).
And, in Protzman’s words:
I found that while specific suggestions or ideas were carried out to the 
leter, no initiative was shown by the Japanese in applying the principles 
underlying these ideas to other comparable situations even in the same 
factory (Protzman, 1950, p. 1).
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 8)　This reference, Protzman’s end of tour report to AT&T, amazingly never mentions 
Sarasohn by name although Sarasohn was every bit as involved in the justification for 
and development of the CCS seminars (soon to be discussed).
To confirm this view they both held that something was needed to improve 
the quality of the management, a survey was undertaken. According to 
Protzman, six representative companies in the communications industry were 
selected. Taking about two weeks for each company Protzman and Sarasohn 
dug into every facet of their management operations starting with:
..the distribution of functions and responsibilities; the extent to which 
authority was delegated; the extent to which sound controls were 
recognized and applied; the nature and efectiveness of organization and 
structure; the gaps or duplications which might cause inefficiency or 
conflict; the fundamental management concepts (Protzman, p. 3).
Folowing this a more detail examination was made of the company’s 
accounting, engineering, manufacturing, supervisory efectiveness, marketing, 
and labor relations. To give some idea of the detail, here is how Protzman 
described what they typicaly looked at in the area of manufacturing techniques: 
“program planning, scheduling, labor eficiency, material usage, scrap control, 
cost control including overhead, process control, inspection, maintenance, 
working conditions, safety, etc.” (p. 3).
Their findings could be summarized from Protzman (pp. 3–4) as folows:
• A lack of basic and consistent policies.
• Haphazard organizational structures.
• Failure to delegate authority suficiently downward.
• Jobs not wel defined.9)
• Management tools (e.g., instructions, personnel policies, etc.) “almost 
completely lacking.”
• Inadequate accounting and cost structures and methods.10)
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 9)　As Protzman (p. 3) put it: “Few lower supervisors knew what their job 
encompassed and fewer yet had any training or managerial background.”
10)　So “profit and loss could [not] be related to the specific function, products or →
However, as Protzman put it, the most significant problem was “the lack of real 
management leadership.” It is most teling that due to this lack of leadership 
“What was needed was a feeling on the part of al the employees that they were 
making a contribution beyond the mechanical performance of job to the wel-
being of the company” (p. 4, emphasis added).11)
Having laid this groundwork, Sarasohn and Protzman wrote a detailed 
Industry Division (of CCS where they worked) memorandum for the record 
(MFR) dated July 27, 1949 with this subject: “A Proposal for a Management 
Training Course for the Communications Manufacturing Industry.” The five-
page MFR stresses the need for the manufacturing arm of the communications 
industry to, in efect, catch up with the research and development (R&D) and 
operations arms. According to the MFR the later two—government agencies 
aided by CCS—were functioning wel at this time. However, the manufacturing 
arm, consisting of “over 300 competitive privately owned companies,” stil 
sufered from not understanding “the fundamental principles of quality control 
and sound economic management.”
The MFR goes on to propose three possible solutions:
• Provide the findings of the survey to the Japanese and let them work out 
the solution—would probably take a long time.
• Provide the findings of the survey to the Japanese government and, aided 
by CCS engineers, let it work out the solution. However this could place 
the government in a position of having too much influence over the 
private companies.
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operations responsible for the conditions.” This meant effective correction action 
could not be taken.
11)　It is apparent that, even with al the progress so far, there was stil a long way to 
go in geting the Japanese managers to practice the kind of “participative” 
management Sarasohn had spoken of before.
→
• Working with the Manufacturers Associations, prepare “training 
programs designed to corect the present weaknesses in industry.”
The MFR then provides several reasons for choosing the third alternative. 
Atached to the basic MFR is a detailed six-step program for carrying out the 
proposed training program including a Gant chart schedule. This MFR was 
“noted” by the Director of the Industry Division of CCS12) and SCAP’s Deputy 
for Telecommunications, a W. L. Wardel.
Curiously, only a short time later, a second Sarasohn and Protzman MFR 
dated August 6, 1949 was published with the subject: “The Need for a 
Management Training Course in the Communications Manufacturing 
Industry”—this time from the Research and Development Division. This three-
page memo was devoted entirely to justification of the proposal set forth in the 
July 27th Industry Division MFR and oficialy noted by a Frank Polkinghorn, 
the director of the R&D Division. Also Sarasohn and Protzman are shown as 
“Res & Dev” engineers.13) This is an indication that perhaps there were some 
problems geting the proposal approved by the Industry Division. In fact, 
Hopper (1982) quotes the folowing from Protzman:
We were able to start the survey [of Japanese companies] with the 
agreement of our [Industry Division] immediate superior. There was, 
however, continual resistance from him14).. ..Then fortunately there was a 
change. Our boss disappeared, and Frank Polkinghorn took over at the end 
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12)　From the signature, it appears to have been noted “for” the Industry Division 
director by another person so perhaps the Industry Division director slot was vacant 
or he was not that interested in such a proposal.
13)　Kenneth Hopper email of October 12, 2011 confirmed from prior direct contact 
with Protzman that Sarasohn and Protzman were reassigned to Polkinghorn’s R&D 
Division.
14)　This may help explain the previous footnote about the proposal MFR not being 
noted directly by the Industry Division director.
of June 1949, adding us to his duties as Director of the Research and 
Development Section.. (p. 19)
So apparently Polkinghorn assumed the additional duty of director of the 
Industry Division and was the catalyst needed to get the training program of the 
ground. As Hopper (1982) put it Polkinghorn “..liked [the idea], found it fuly 
in line with SCAP policy, and ‘against the kind of resistance you get to any new 
idea in any bureaucracy’ pressed SCAP for approval to mount the [training] 
seminars.” Hopper goes on to say “Protzman is convinced that, without 
[Polkinghorn], the seminars would never have been presented” (p. 20).
Indicative of the resistance Sarasohn and Protzman experienced is a story 
Sarasohn tels of how the issue of presenting such training to the Japanese was 
objected to by the large and powerful Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) to 
the point where it had to be decided by MacArthur himself. This happened 
occasionaly on maters regarded as very important in which case the mater 
would be setled in what SCAP staff caled ‘a floor show.’ It took place in a 
large room outside MacArthur’s ofice. Each side was given twenty minutes to 
present their arguments. First the ESS presented the case against the seminars.15) 
Then Sarasohn presented the case for. “MacArthur sat at his desk,” Sarasohn 
remembered, “smoking his corncob pipe, saying not a word, the expression on 
his face never changing. Suddenly he got up and walked to the door to his 
ofice, stil without a word. I thought, ‘I’ve blown it.’ Then MacArthur turned, 
stared at me, said ‘Go do it’ and walked out” (Kenneth Hopper record of 
interview with Sarasohn).
5. The CCS Seminars
There were two identical management-training seminars, one in Tokyo 
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15)　ESS argued that giving too much help to the Japanese would make them too 
competitive with the U.S.
running from September 26, 1949 until November 18, 1949 and the one in 
Osaka immediately folowing from November 21, 1949 until January 20, 1950. 
According to Fisher (2008) they were “..for top management only;16) no 
substitutes were permited. As planned, the course ran for 4 hours each day, 4 
days a week, with homework each night” (p. 9). Sarasohn and Protzman were 
the presenters and Polkinghorn introduced each seminar.17)
Because they could not find any text suitable18) for the unique needs of the 
course Sarasohn and Protzman wrote one. As Hopper & Hopper (2007) told it:
The two engineers retreated for two and a half months to a quiet and 
rundown hotel in Osaka that had been taken over by the US Army for 
oficers’ rest and recreation. No noisy parties were permited and female 
guest were excluded—even wives (p. 120).
Sarasohn (1997) describes the “CCS Manual” this way:
It is not a philosophical or academic treatise. It lays a practical and 
pragmatic foundation for progressive management. Protzman’s half of the 
book covers such subjects as manufacturing engineering, cost control, 
factory layout and inventory management. My half deals with management 
policy formation, long range strategy and planning, organizational 
structures, research and product development and quality control. Statistical 
quality and process control occupied more space in the book and more time 
in the lectures than any other subject (p. 108).
And so the CCS seminars commenced in Tokyo on September 26, 1949. 
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16)　Some of the companies represented included Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, Sumitomo 
Electric, Matsushita Electric, and Sanyo Sharp (or their predecessor companies).
17)　According to Fisher (2008, p. 9) Sarasohn taught in Japanese—most impressive 
given how dificult it must have been to learn the language in his spare time. This is 
probably an indication of just how devoted Sarasohn was to his job. Also al 
indications are that Protzman was equaly devoted and hard working.
18)　Protzman (1950) cites three reasons for this on pages 4–5.
Company policy was one of the first areas addressed including the fundamental 
question of why the company existed. When caled upon by Sarasohn to 
“..recite the basic beliefs, the fundamental purposes and goals of their 
organizations” only one of the 24 senior executives responded—“al the others 
were stunned into silence when they realized they had no answer” (pp. 
108–109). Figure 2 was used in the seminar to show the importance of having a 
company policy. In the CCS Manual, entitled The Fundamental of Industrial 
Management, (Sarasohn & Protzman, 1949) the figure is explained this way:
Making a clear statement of the objective of the enterprise is like providing 
a target for a man shooting an arrow with a bow. [Figure 2] shows such a 
man who represents company management holding a bow which represents 
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Figure 2. The objectives of the enterprise (from Sarasohn & 
Protzman, 1949, p. 177)
company policies and an arrow which represents the total efforts and 
resources of the company. If no target is provided for management (the 
man), toward which company efforts and resources (the arrow) can be 
aimed and directed, company policies (the bow), no mater how good they 
may be wil be uterly useless. But altogether, policies, efforts and 
resources and ultimate purpose to which they are to be put are al part of a 
single picture. Any one part has a definite intimate inter-relationship with 
every other part, and no one part is able to stand alone. Each demands the 
co-existence of the other elements in order to comprise the total picture 
which is the entire business enterprise (p. 2).
The table of contents for the CCS Manual (Sarasohn & Protzman, 1949) is 
shown in the Appendix. This table gives some idea of the comprehensiveness of 
what was covered subsumed under the major headings of Management Policy, 
Organization, Controls, and Operations. Kenneth Hopper (1982 & 1985) 
provides some excelent insights into what the Manual covered and, in turn, the 
seminars themselves. For example in discussing the importance of a company 
having a clear objective, Hopper (1985, p. 37) notes the Manual cites that of the 
founder of the Newport News Shipyard: “We shal build good ships here—At a 
profit, if we can—At a loss, if we must—But always good ships.” This was also 
a lead-in to the importance of quality. Hopper notes, “The separate section on 
quality was lengthy. Of the manual’s 400 typed pages, 63 were devoted to 
quality control” (p. 37).19)
Hopper also discusses how the CCS seminars’ take on human relations (HR) 
differed from American and British views that a saw “..leading as being 
different from folowing, therefore alowing, if not demanding, different 
qualities.” To show this Hopper quotes Sarasohn: “A leader’s main obligation is 
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19)　As also mentioned in the Sarasohn quote above.
to secure the faith and respect of those under him” and “(the leader) must 
himself be the best example of what he would like to see in his folowers” 
(p. 37).
Both Hopper articles (1982 & 1985) provide lengthy discussions of the HR 
aspects of the seminars and the value of that information. As Hopper (1982) put 
it: “The [HR] information.. ..may have weaknesses, but it was put together by 
able people during a remarkable period of management creativity. We must be 
thankful to have it” (pp. 23–24).
Hopper also points out the emphasis given to democracy as indicated by a 
foreword to the Manual writen by Polkinghorn. As Polkinghorn (1950) says in 
the foreword, these “occidental” ideas “..may not be clear to the oriental mind.” 
Perhaps this is a subtle reference to the military-dominated society to which the 
Japanese had just been subjected. Hopper, recaling a discussion he had with 
Polkinghorn, states (1982) “Polkinghorn tels me he wrote this introduction 
specificaly because he felt he must stress the contribution democratic practices 
made to successful management” (p. 26). This brief excerpt from Polkinghorn’s 
foreword (1950) provides a feel for what he was trying to tel the Japanese:
Democratic western civilization.. ..believes in equality; not the equality of 
position or ability, which may be beyond the control of man, but the 
equality of opportunity which wil permit an individual to move from one 
position to another, or one social class to another, depending to a large 
measure upon his own ability, initiative, and industriousness.
In other words, recognize the inherent worth of each person and give that person 
every opportunity to contribute not only to his/her own wel being but also to 
the company’s.
This idea relates closely to another feature of the CCS seminar that Hopper 
points out which is the emphasis on botom-up management. Hopper (1982 & 
1985) cites a couple of places in the Manual where it is prety obvious 
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Sarasohn/Protzman felt this emphasis was justified. For example in discussing 
the topic of Zones of Management20) this rather damming statement—based on 
their review of the communications manufacturing companies—was made:
For one thing you do not zone your responsibilities and authorities in a 
manner that wil make top management or lower management effective. 
The President of a company wil be so involved in smal details, in 
approving what should be routine action, that he does not have the time to 
be President. A managing director wil be interesting himself in the details 
of operation of a smal part of his job rather than planning and coordinating 
his entire organization. And the people at lower levels who should be 
responsible and accountable for and have the authority to do these detail 
functions are confused by the lack of proper definition of their job and by 
the lack of true responsibility and authority. Further any initiative and 
interest they may have in trying to do a job is often destroyed by the 
interference and meddling of higher management (Sarasohn & Protzman, 
1949, p. 19, emphasis added).
Sarasohn underlined this point in his 1997 presentation noting that when they 
came to the subject of organization in the seminars the atendees “acknowledged 
that job assignments were generaly vague and unwriten” and that “overlap in 
functional activities was common and no atempt was made to resolve obvious 
conflicts (p. 109).
With respect to the important subject of quality, Sarasohn (1997) notes that 
his main purpose was to be sure they didn’t think of it as “exclusively or 
uniquely a mathematical or engineering function” but rather “a spectrum of 
factors that together assure the atainment of pre-determined levels of acceptable 
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20)　The idea that in an “eficient company” various levels of management are “separate 
and distinct” in which “functions are defined, authority is specified, and 
accountability is actualy required” (Sarasohn & Protzman, 1949, p. 13).
product performance” (p. 109). And further that the level of quality for a 
product “is decided at the very beginning by its inherent design.” Given our 
knowledge of quality today, wise words indeed.
This sampling of comments on/from the Manual and on the seminars gives 
the reader a feel for the sort of things Sarasohn and Protzman were trying to 
convey to the top executives of the communications manufacturing companies. 
Things that were then current practices in good management in the U.S.; a time 
Hopper and Hopper (2007) characterize in chapter nine of their book The 
Puritan Gift, as the “Golden Age of American Management.”
The idea was for the atendees to take what they learned and flow it down. 
And Protzman (1950), in his report, states that in fact almost al “went back to 
their own companies and began.. .. to acquaint the rest of their own top 
managements with the principles and practices we had outlined” (p. 5). 
Furthermore and significantly he states:
As a result of the widespread publicity given our work by the Japanese 
Management Association other companies not associated with 
communications became actively interested in taking the course, and at the 
time I left [May 1950] the Communications Manufacturers Association was 
conducting repeat conferences for some of these companies. Among these 
were companies from the Electric Heavy Industry, the Chemical and 
Textile Industry and the Machine Manufacturing Industry (pp. 5–6).
Both Sarasohn and Protzman felt the course had more than met their 
expectations. Sarasohn (1997, pp. 109–110) cites three factors: the enthusiastic 
folow-up by the top executive students within their own companies, reports of 
improvements they received, and a commitment by the Federation of 
Communications Industrial Associations to continue the CCS course for those 
not able to atend the first one and for other industries (as mentioned in the 
Protzman quote above).
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6. The Aftermath
So it is evident the CCS seminars and Manual had an immediate positive 
efect on the Japanese communications manufacturing industry. However, the 
efect of this action by Sarasohn, Protzman, and Polkinghorn, the “three wise 
men” as Hopper and Hopper termed them in chapter 10 of The Puritan Gift, 
was far more widespread. Perhaps one of the best descriptions of the efects of 
the CCS seminars is contained in Hopper (1982):
There can be litle doubt that the Civil Communications Section and its 
engineers made an important contribution to Japanese industry and the 
Japanese economy. On quality, perhaps the best documented evidence of 
CCS’ contribution came in the 15th anniversary edition of Quality Control 
(1965) published by the remarkably creative and influential Japan Union of 
Scientists and Engineers (JUSE). Quality Control honored “five pioneers” 
of Quality Control in Japan. Al five, either in this anniversary issue or 
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Figure 3. The three wise men along with their translator. From 
the left: Homer Sarasohn, Frank Polkinghorn, and 
Charles Protzman (from Hopper, 1985, p. 35)
elsewhere, have referred to CCS as an early source of their quality 
inspiration or instruction (p. 29)
Hopper goes on to cite comments by several prominent Japanese on the positive 
efect the CCS seminars have had on Japanese management.
Fisher (2008) notes in his conclusions: “A 4-day version of the CCS course 
continued to run until 1974, under the auspices of the Japanese Industrial and 
Vocational Training Association (JIVTA)..” (p. 20). Fisher also quotes from 
Adams & Moranti (2008): “The CCS ofered a solid institutional foundation that 
Japanese managers adapted to local economic and cultural circumstances, 
contributing to Japan’s spectacular takeoff in global electronic markets 
beginning in the 1960s.”
Hopper (1982) elaborates considerably on this last point; i.e., how the 
Japanese adapted what they learned from the Americans in the CCS seminars to 
their own culture. For example Hopper cites information he personaly gained 
from Bunzaemon Inoue, who, at the time of the CCS seminars, was with 
Sumitomo Electric Industries (SEI).21) Quoting from Hopper (1982): “It is in the 
areas of human relations that Mr. Inoue, despite his praise of CCS material and 
of advisors like [the famous] Dr. Drucker, denies great American influence and 
argues that the sources of Japan’s now world-wide famous practices are 
Japanese culture” (pp. 30–31).
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21)　Inoue was very active in promoting the CCS seminars and, per a Kenneth Hopper 
email (July 25, 2011), was largely responsible for SEI receiving the coveted Deming 
Prize  for quality in 1962. According to Kenneth’s brother, Wiliam, “Without his 
contribution [promoting the CCS seminars/material], in al probability, the invaluable 
lessons that the Americans taught would have falen on stony ground; the various 
Asian Economic Miracles might not have happened” (The Puritan Gift Weblog, April 
29, 2010). Inoue later  became president and chairman of Sumitomo Rubber. He and 
Kenneth Hopper carried on a lively exchange of leters on factory management 
between 1979 and 1986 (short paper by K. Hopper entitled Leters From a Sensei).
Despite any “negative” criticism of the CCS seminars it is apparent that much 
good came from them at a time when Japan was sorely in need of such 
management information. The seminars and flow-down from them can be 
rightly credited with playing a big part in Japan’s recovery and rapid rise to 
economic prominence in the world. And also on the afect this prominence no 
doubt had on other countries such as the rise of the “Asian Tigers,” and, 
ironicaly, America when Japan began eating into its consumer electronics and 
automobile markets in the 1970s.
7. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this article has been to relate from mostly first-hand sources 
the story of how two American engineers, Homer Sarasohn and Charles 
Protzman, worked closely with Japanese manufacturers after World War II to 
initiate a management training program which played a big part in Japan’s rise 
from the ashes of war to become among one of the greatest economies in the 
world.
They were aided by a third person, Frank Polkinghorn, whose help greatly 
facilitated their eforts. As mentioned, in their book, The Puritan Gift (2007), 
the Hopper brothers, Kenneth and Wiliam, cal these three “the three wise 
men.”  Detailing the eforts of these three, including the trials and tribulations 
they went through, has been the reason for this article. The articled also briefly 
discussed “the aftermath” showing how the CCS seminars have had a lasting 
afect, not only on Japan but also with many other countries. It is very likely 
that what happened in Japan in those immediate post-war years could have 
application again today as we see so many nations emerging from their 
dictatorial rule and striving to renew themselves much as Japan did after WWII. 
Perhaps the CCS story related here wil inspire thinking along these lines as 
America strives to do it’s part in helping other nations become viable 
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democracies.
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Appendix
CCS Manual Table of Contents
(from Sarasohn & Protzman, 1949, p. ii)
